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specifically refers to "the assignment". What then would be the legal
solution to a situation involving several assignments together with
an equal number of notices that had been received by the account
debtor? The section specifies that the rights of the assignee are
subject to those defences that accrued "before" the account debtor
received notice of the assignment. The situation contemplated by
Section 37(1) (b) would consequently stand in complete hostility to
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. However, section 37
does not qualify or limit itself by any reference that subsections (a)
and (b) are necessarily the only rights to which an assignee is
subjected.
A brief conclusion may be drawn at this point. If the rights
of an assignee are subject to additional claims of defenses other
than those enumerated in section 37 of the draft bill, an additional
claim or defense certainly must include the one as promulgated in this
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. Said defense or set-off
arose on the ground that the account debtor was "entitled", yet not
legally bound in the absence of fraud, either to inform or to volunteer
information to the assignee of the potential right of set-off that
could and did, in fact, result, from an independant sales transaction
by the account debtor to the assignor.

CRIMINAL LAW
Regina v. Cotd, [1964] S.C.R. 1.
R. WITrE=CK :'
CAPITAL MURDER ACCUSED AND COMPANION COMMITTING ROBBERY
VICTIM DYING FROM INJURIES INFLICTED TO FACILITATE OFFENCE
-INJURIES
MUST BE CAUSED OR AIDED BY ACCUSED'S OWN ACT TO BE

-

GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER -

DRUNKENESS AS A POSSIBLE DEFENCE

WHETHER JURY PROPERLY DIRECTED -

CRIMINAL CODE, ss.

202,

202A.
The accused, Marcel Cot6, was charged and found guilty1 of the
offence of capital murder under the combined effect of s. 202A(2)
4
(b) (i)2 and s. 202 (a) (i) and (ii)3 of the Canadian Criminal Code.
*Mr. Witterick is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.

1 The trial decision was not reported.

2 202A(2). Murder is capital murder, in respect of any person, where
(b) it is within section 202 and such person
(i) by his own act caused or assisted in causing the bodily harm
from which death resulted.
3 202. Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of
a human being while committing or attempting to commit treason or an
offence mentioned in section 52, piracy, escape or rescue from prison or lawful
[Footnote Continued Next Page.]
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By a decision of three to two the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside this
verdict and ordered a new trial on the charge. 5 Relying on the provisions of s. 598(1) (a) ,6 the Crown brought this appeal in the Supreme
7
Court of Canada.
The facts of the assault, as revealed by the testimony of the
accused's accomplice, who was the only person to give testimony on
this matter, are not in dispute in the appeal. Cot6 (the accused) and
Dumas (his accomplice), knowing that the victim kept a sum of money
in a valise in his home, broke into the house at night with the intention
of stealing this money. While Dumas went to the room where the
money was kept, the accused entered the victim's room, where a fight
ensued. Hearing the sound of fighting and the victim calling for help,
Dumas entered the room and found the accused struggling with the
victim. Dumas then proceeded to tie and gag the victim while the
accused held him. Dumas also testified that he felt something warm
on his hands after tying the victim, which he later realized was blood.
The victim was found dead beside his bed two days later. The evidence
showed that he had been brutally attacked: almost all the bones of his
face as well as several ribs were broken.
Two objections to the charge of the trial judge were raised on
this appeal. The first involved the question whether, in failing to
delineate the respective roles of the accused and his accomplice in the
commission of the offence and in failing to submit the alternative of
non-capital murder as a possible verdict, the judge left the jury with
the impression that they could convict the accused even if they thought
the fatal injuries were caused by Dumas alone without the assistance
,of the accused. It was the theory of the defence that the direction of
the learned judge may have left such an impression, whereas the
definition of the crime of capital murder in s. 202A (2) (b) (i) expressly
requires that the accused by his own act contribute to the causing of
the death.
-custody, resisting lawful arrest, rape, indecent assault, forcible abduction,
,robbery, burglary or arson, whether or not the person means to cause death
to any human being and whether or not he knows that death is likely to be
caused to any human being, if
(a) he means to cause bodily harm for the purpose of
() facilitating the commission of the offence, or
(ii) facilitating his flight after committing or attempting to
commit the offence.
-and death ensues from the bodily harm. (1960-61, c. 44, s. 1).
4 Stat. Can. 1953-54, 2-3 Elizabeth II, c. 51 as amended by 1960-61, c. 44, s. 1.
5 CotM v. The Queen, [1963] Que. Q.B. 895, 43 C.R. 150, (Que. Q.B., Appeal
Side).
6 598 (1). Where a judgment of a court of appeal sets aside a conviction
pursuant to an appeal taken under section 583 or 583A or dismisses an appeal
taken pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 584, the Attorney
,General may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. (1960-61 c. 44, s. 12)
(a) on any question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal
dissents.
7 Regina v. CotM, [1964] S.C.R. 1, 43 C.R. 165, 3 C.C.C. 301, 47 D.L.R. (2d)
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The second issue raised, but not considered by the Supreme Court
to merit as full a discussion as the first, was the trial judge's failure
to direct the jury on the possible defence of drunkenness.
As to the first issue, all the Justices of the Supreme Court were
agreed on the principles of law involved. They were unanimous in their
opinion that in order for an accused to be convicted of capital murder
under s. 202A in respect of murder falling under s. 202, it is necessary
that he participate by his own act in causing the death and that it
would be a fatal misdirection to charge the jury that it was not
material whether the injuries were caused by the accused or his companion. However they did not agree as to whether the learned trial
judge did properly direct the jury; the majority holding that he did so,
the minority that he did not.
Fauteux J., speaking for the majority,8 disposed of the issue in
the following way: From the evidence adduced at the trial only two
alternatives were possible. The jury could either accept the testimony
of Dumas as to the details of the assault or they could reject it and
accept the theory of the defense that the murder was committed later
by third parties. (Because the accused did not himself take the stand,
Dumas's testimony as to the details of the assault is the only testimony
on the subject.) If they accepted the testimony (which they must have
done in view of their verdict) they must find him guilty of capital murder. If, on the other hand, they rejected Dumas's story then the only
possible verdict was one of acquittal. Because there were only two
factual alternatives available from the evidence (either he assisted
Dumas or he was not involved in the crime at all), there were only
two legal results which could follow (if he assisted Dumas, he was
guilty of capital murder; if he had no part in the murder, he was
entirely innocent). There was no source from which the jury could find
the elements necessary to constitute the offence of non-capital murder,
except from the testimony of Dumas, but having accepted that testimony the jury must reasonably conclude that the assault was the
work of two attackers, each assisting the other. (Logically, of course,
there was another alternative, and that was that the jury might have
believed Dumas in part only. They might have believed him as to the
happening of the fatal assault, but have concluded that the accused
had not actively participated.)
In any case Fauteux J. held that the trial judge did not leave the
jury with the impression that even if the injuries were caused only by
Dumas without the assistance of the accused, they might still find the
accused guilty of capital murder. While there may be isolated passages
in the charge which might leave the jury with this impression, the
charge read as a whole could not be so construed. He cited D.P.P.
v. Beard9 as authority for the proposition that a judge in directing
a jury is not writing in abstracto a treatise on the criminal law and
8 Including Taschereau C.J.C., Abbott, Martland, Judson and Ritchie JJ..
9 [1920] A.C. 479, 495-6.
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that his words must be considered in relation to the facts before the
0
jury.1
Cartwright J.11 dissented from the majority, preferring instead
the reasoning of Tremblay C.J.Q. and Hyde J. in the Court of Appeal,
where it was held that the learned trial judge failed to delineate the
respective roles of the accused and his accomplice to determine if the
accused assisted by his own act and thereby committed capital murder.
Cartwright J. held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury
that if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Dumas and
the accused had formed a common intention to carry out the burglary
and to assist each other for that purpose and that the accused knew
or ought to have known that the infliction of bodily harm would be a
probable result of carrying out the common purpose, then Cotd would
be guilty of capital murder even if the bodily harm which caused the
death was inflicted by Dumas alone without the assistance of the
accused. He pointed out that the portions of the charge which related
to the Crown's burden of proving that death resulted from blows administered by the accused and Dumas were directed to the theory of
the defence that the murder was committed by third parties who
arrived later. Nowhere in the charge was this mistaken view of the
law clarified. And, according to Cartwright J., this error was fatal to
the validity of the conviction in that the provisions of s. 592(1) (b)
(iii)12 of the Code cannot be invoked where the jury has been misdirected as to an essential element of the charge.
The principles of law on which the learned trial judge proceeded
in his direction, and particularly those objected to by Cartwright J.,
seem to follow logically from a combination of s. 21(2)13 and s. 202A.
The effect of s. 21 (2) may be that a person is gilty of capital murder
where he knew or ought to have known that that offence would be a
probable consequence of his carrying out an unlawful purpose in combination with another, even though he has not actually participated by
his own act in causing the injuries which bring about death. What little
10 See also Annotations:

Correlating the evidence to the issues for the benefit of the jury, 15
C.R. 262;
Summing up the evidence in a criminal case, 15 C.R. 190; Jurys right
to determine the facts, 12 C.R. 180.
11 With whom Hall and Spence JJ. concurred.
12 592(1) on the hearing of an appeal against a conviction, the court of
appeal
(b) may dismiss the appeal where
(iii) notwithstanding that the court is of the opinion that on any
ground mentioned in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a) the
appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, it is of the
opinion that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has
occurred.
13 21(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry
out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them,
in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who
knew or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would
be a probable consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to
that offence.

19651

Supreme Court Review

case law there is on the subject, however, does not support this conclusion.14
In the recent case of Regina v. Cassidy and Letendre,'5 two
accused were charged jointly with murder and the Alberta Court of
Appeal held that there was nothing to prevent the jury from finding
one guilty of capital murder and the other of non-capital murder where
the elements necessary to s. 202A were not present in the case of the
second accused. The following statement of Anglin J. (as he then was)
in Remillard v. The King,16 a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada,
was expressly adopted:
The character of the offence actually committed by each must be decided
by the jury charged with the disposition of the indictment against him.
This statement, though directed to the situation where two accused
are tried jointly, does serve to emphasize that in all cases where more
than one person is involved in the commission of an offence, it is necessary to distinguish the r~le of each in order to attach liability
accordingly.
And this view is again upheld in the recent case of Regina v.
Leclair'7 a case which reached the Supreme Court of Canada after the
Cotr case. Here the accused was charged and convicted of capital
murder. He was alleged to have been one of two persons who, in
attempting to rob a service station, inflicted injuries on the victim
which caused his death. The Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously held
that there should be a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had
erred in failing to direct the jury that they must, to convict, find
that the accused assisted by his own act in causing the death. Montgomery J. clearly and boldly declared that s. 21 had been modified in
the case of murder by the provisions of s. 202A(2). Unfortunately the
Supreme Court never had the opportunity to adopt this view expressly.
On the appeal, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction
under s. 598 (1) (a) because there was no dissent in law.' 8
In summary, therefore, it is submitted that first, the operation
of s. 21(2) has been limited with regard to murder by s. 202A, and that
second, the accused may only be convicted under s. 202A where he
assists by his own act in bringing about the death (or counsels or procures it to be done).19 With respect to the learned Justices it is to be
14 On this subject see also:

Practice Note: Murder, aiding and abetting, common intention, (1957),
26 C.R. 28.
Annotation: Constructive complicity in crime.
15 (1963), 41 W.W.R. 669, 40 C.R. 171 (Alta. C.A.).
16 (1921), 62 S.C.R. 21, at 24, 35 C.C.C. 227.

17 (1964), 43 C.R. 184, (Que. Q.B., Appeal Side) on appeal, 43 C.R. 196
(S.C.C.).
'SSupra, footnote 6.
19 202A(2) Murder is capital murder, where
(b) it is within section 202 and such person

(v) counselled or procured another person to do any act mentioned
in sub-paragraph (i), (ii) or (iii) or to use any weapon mentioned in sub--paragraph (iv).
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regretted that the majority overlooked the problem posed by s. 21 (2)
altogether and that Cartwright J., though recognizing the problem, did
not speak boldly and decisively, as did Montgomery J. in the Court of
Appeal.
The second objection taken to the direction of the trial judge was
that he failed to instruct the jury on the possible defense of drunkenness. At the trial no evidence was adduced by defense counsel to suggest that the accused and his friend were incapable of forming the
specific intent to cause bodily injury for the purpose of facilitating
the commission of the offence or their subsequent escape, though there
was evidence of consumption of alcohol on the day of the crime. With
this in mind, the trial judge concluded that it was not necessary to
put the possible defense to the jury.
However, two judges (Hyde and Casey JJ.) of the Quebec Court
of Appeal were of the opinion that drunkenness should have been
submitted to the jury for a decision on the basis of the reasoning
in Wu v. The King20 and Henderson v. The King.2 1 And, having
accepted this principle, they did not think that the evidence fell short
of what was required.
The reasoning of the Appeal Court Justices was not discussed
in any of the judgments in the Supreme Court, but was dismissed
rather summarily by both Fauteux J. and Taschereau J. in no more
22
than a few sensences.
It seems clear on the basis of the case law23 that:
The fact that a defending counsel does not stress an alternative case
before the jury (which he may well feel it difficult to do without prejudicIng the main defense) does not relieve the judge from the duty of directing
the jury to consider the alternative if there is material before the jury
which would justify a direction that they should consider it.... Whatever
the line of defense adopted by counsel at the trial of a prisoner, we are of
the opinion that it is for the judge to put such questions as appear to
him properly to arise upon the evidence,
even though counsel may not
have raised some question himself. 24
This statement was expressly adopted by Hyde J. in Langlois v. The
Queen.25 In this case the accused had relied entirely on the defense of
self-defense and the trial judge instructed the jury that if they
accepted this defense they should acquit the accused; but if they
accepted the Crown's version they should convict on a charge of
[1934) S.C.R. 609, 62 C.C.C. 90, [19343 4 D.L.R. 459.
[1948) S.C.R. 226, at 241, 5 C.R. 112, 91 C.C.C. 97.
22 [19643 S.C.R. 1.
23 Rex v. Swanson (1950), 10 C.R. 81, 96 C.C.C. 227, [19503 1 W.W.R. 1001
(B.C.C.A.).
Langlois v. The Queen (1962), 38 C.R. 246.
Rex v. Krawchuk, [1914] 3 W.W.R. 540, 56 B.C.R. 7, 75 C.C.C. 16;
affirmed, 75 C.C.C. 219, [19143 2 D.L.R. 353.
Kwaiku Mensak v. The King, [19463 2 W.W.R. 455, 2 C.R. 113, [19463
A.C. 83, 115 L.J.P.C. 20.
Rex v. Hughes, [1942] S.C.R. 517, 78 C.C.C. 257, [19433 1 D.L.R. 1.
24 Mancini v. D.P.P., [19423 A.C. 1, at 7.
25 (1962), 38 C.R. 246.
20
21
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murder. But he did not tell the jury that they might bring in a verdict
of manslaughter if they believed the accused acted under provocation.
A new trial was ordered.
However, a trial judge is not required to instruct a jury on an
alternative defense which is not raised by counsel where there is no
evidence or foundation of fact which would justify such a direction or
which cannot reasonably be supported on any view of the evidence. 26
It is submitted that in this case there was no sufficient foundation in
fact justifying a direction of a possible verdict of drunkenness and that
the Supreme Court was correct in restoring the decision of the trial
judge on the matter.

Koury v. The Queen [1964] S.C.R. 212.
FRANK K. ROBERTS*

CRIMINAL LAW - RES JUDICATA - POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
REVERSE A TRIAL COURT DECISION ON ONE CHARGE WHEN APPEAL IS
TAKEN ONLY AS TO THE DECISION ON OTHER CHARGE.

This was an Appeal by the accused, Koury, from a Judgment of the
Court of Appeal for Ontario upholding the conviction for fraud of the
four co-accused, upholding the conviction for conspiracy of the three
accused, other than Koury, and upholding the acquittal of the accused
Koury on a conspiracy charge to commit the fraud for which he was
in fact convicted.
The sole issue of the Appeal was whether the conviction of Koury
of fraud was inconsistent with his acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to commit that very fraud. In acquitting the accused of
conspiracy, the Jury must have found that he withdrew from the
association before the conspiracy had been entered into. The case put
against Koury on the fraud count was that he was an aider and abettor
and therefore the Crown had to show a conscious participation in a
common design and conscious and deliberate assistance between the
aider and abettor and the other persons.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that aiding
and abetting persuant to a common intent and design is not necessarily
the same thing as conspiracy.
Mullins v. The Queen (1952), 15 C.R. 99.
(Que. Q.B., Appeal Side)
Rex v. Malanik (1951), 13 C.R. 160, 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 577.
101 C.C.CQ 182 (Man. C.A.); affirmed, [19521 2 S.C.R. 335, 14 C.R. 367,
103 C.C.C. 1.
Rex v. Gauthier (1943), 29 Cr. App. R. 189.
Rex, v. Flett, (1943) 1 W.W.R. 672, 69 B.C.R. 25, 79 C.C.C. 183, [19431 2
D.L.R. 656.
Rex v. Thorpe (1925), 18 Cr. App. R. 189.
*Mr. Roberts is a lawyer with the firm of Keith, Ganong, Mahony and
Keith.
26

